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Abstract When disaster strikes, the weak suffer mightily, the strong only slightly. That 
is the lesson from stock market reactions to COVID-19. Strong firms had a robust financial 
position, advanced environmental and social performance, and were not severely ex-
posed to social distancing and lockdowns. Firms with significant international exposure 
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those by central banks, have yet to be revealed. The market recovery in the second 
quarter of 2020 is like a patient recovering from COVID-19: hopeful but still uncertain. 
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 took the world economy by surprise. The topic 
“infectious diseases” was ranked number 10 in terms of impact in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2020, published on January 15, 2020, 
but was considered quite unlikely. Only a few weeks later, attention shift-
ed dramatically. On March 11, the World Health Organization character-
ised COVID-19 as a pandemic. While in the second quarter of 2020 in many 
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countries – except notably in the US, Brazil, and some other coun-
tries – case and death growth rates had slowed down or reversed, at 
the end of June 2020, uncertainty is again rising as countries such as 
China experience new outbreaks and are again considering severe 
lockdowns. Especially in light of the possibility of a second pandem-
ic wave, it is useful to look back and consider what can be learned 
from financial market responses to the first wave.
As a tool supporting decisions about public policy interventions 
but also private sector choices, asset price changes can be extreme-
ly valuable. In essence, asset markets provide ongoing, high-stakes 
surveys regarding future expected outcomes. For corporate decision-
makers, it is especially important to learn from COVID-19 about what 
makes firms resilient when a tail risk is realised. 
Although the focus currently is on COVID-19, it should be stressed 
that tail risks do exist in various domains. The lessons learnt from 
this pandemic are likely to be valuable also in the context of other tail 
risks, for instance those related to climate change or cybersecurity. 
This paper begins by reviewing the worldwide stock-market de-
velopment in section 2. Section 3 summarises which firms were most 
affected by the crisis. Section 4 reviews the stock-market based ev-
idence on policy interventions. While virtually all research so far 
deals with the crisis period of the first quarter of 2020, section 5 
provides insights on the recovery phase in the second quarter. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Overall Stock Returns Over Time
This section documents some facts about the global stock market per-
formance. It is important to distinguish different phases of the crisis. 
We follow Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming) for details of the timing 
and expand the timeline of that study with newer data. Specifical-
ly, we organise our primary analysis along four periods: Incubation 
(Thursday, January 2 through Friday, January 17)1, Outbreak (Mon-
day, January 20 through Friday, February 21)2, Fever (Monday, Feb-
ruary 24 through Friday, March 20)3, and Recovery (Monday, March 
We thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments.
1 On December 31, 2019, cases of pneumonia detected in Wuhan, China, were first 
reported to the WHO. On January 1, 2020, Chinese health authorities closed the Hua-
nan Seafood Wholesale Market after it was discovered that wild animals sold there 
may be the source of the virus.
2 On January 20, Chinese health authorities confirmed human-to-human transmis-
sion of the Coronavirus, and the WHO issued the first situation report on the outbreak. 
3 On February 23, Italy placed almost 50,000 people under strict lockdown in Lom-
bardy, one of the country’s most productive regions.
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23 through June 8).4 Obviously, further updates may require the ad-
dition of a Relapse phase and other periods.
We retrieve daily stock prices for common shares from the Com-
pustat North America and Compustat Global databases (from Whar-
ton Research Data Services, WRDS). We adjust prices for dividends 
and stock splits, and we keep only common stocks listed on major 
stock exchanges in countries covered by the MSCI EQWI index (in-
cluding both developed and developing countries).5 We convert all 
prices in USD, and we drop firms with less than USD10 million of 
market capitalisation as of December 31, 2019. We end up with a sam-
ple of around 31,200 firms headquartered in 90 different countries. 
Figure 1a plots equally-weighted stock returns in USD across coun-
tries with at least 50 firms, while figure 1b plots the value-weight-
ed ones.6 (Figures in local currency are available on request.) Sever-
al simple facts emerge. First, most countries saw their average firm 
decline in value over the almost two quarters under consideration 
(black bars). Second, the average firm performed best in Poland, Tur-
key, and Saudi Arabia, and worst in Mexico, South Africa, and Bra-
zil. The best value-weighted performance occurred in Saudi Arabia, 
Denmark, and China; the worst in South Africa, Greece, and Brazil. 
Third, every single country experienced negative (positive) equal- 
and value-weighted average returns in the Fever (Recovery) peri-
ods [figs. 1a-b]. 
4 On Monday, March 23, the US Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced a compre-
hensive bond purchase program (see § 4). The highest point that the S&P500 reached 
in June was obtained on June 8, so we stop this period then.
5 We defined major stock exchanges as in Chaieb, Langlois, Scaillet 2020. 
6 We consider both equal- and value-weighted figures because of the recent tenden-
cy, at least in some countries, of a pronounced concentration of market values among 
a few companies.
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Figures 1a-1b Cumulative returns across the world from January 2 through June 8, 2020
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3 What Makes Firms Resilient Against Tail Risks?  
Learnings from COVID-19
Figures 1a and 1b confirm that COVID-19 had a tremendous effect 
on stock markets. While those figures highlight the average perfor-
mance, COVID-19 has differentially affected the valuations of com-
panies in the first quarter of 2020.
First, consider industry effects. In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcom-
ing), we show that, in the US, telecom services, food and staples 
retailing, and utilities performed relatively well. Energy, consumer 
services, and transportation were among the biggest losers. As an 
ominous sign that the crisis was at least potentially wide-reaching, 
in the Fever period consumer services were among the biggest los-
ers, and food and staples retailers were among the strongest win-
ners (again, relatively speaking). The between-industry differences 
observed in the Fever period intuitively reflect different degrees of 
disruption in firms’ operations caused by social distancing and lock-
down measures.7 As shown in figure 2, similar considerations also 
emerge when looking at the between-industry performance in our in-
ternational sample of firms [fig. 2].
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Figure 2 Stock returns by industry, international sample
7 Several measures of the extent to which job activities in different sectors can be 
carried out from home and without human interaction in physical proximity are now 
available (Dingel, Neiman 2020; Hensvik, Le Barbanchon, Rathelot 2020; Koren, Pető 
2020). See Pagano, Wagner, Zechner 2020 for an analysis.
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Second, especially in the Fever phase concerns about corporate debt 
(leverage) and corporate liquidity (cash holdings) started to play an 
important role (Ramelli, Wagner forthcoming). Figure 3 illustrates 
this result in the international sample, focusing on the return effects 
of being in the top quartiles of leverage or cash holdings [fig. 3]. With-
in the same industry and controlling for standard firm characteris-
tics (size, book-to-market, and profitability), highly-indebted firms 
suffered severely in the Fever period; high-cash firms performed 
relatively better. Intuitively, high-cash firms are more likely able to 
survive and to preserve or expand their physical and human capi-
tal.8 Additionally, from a systemic perspective, the surge in the val-
ue of cash also suggests that as the crisis unfolded investors became 
increasingly concerned about a tightening of firms’ access to exter-
nal finance. The policy measures taken by central banks seek to ad-
dress this concern; indeed, in the Recovery period, the effects of cash 
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Figure 3 Relative cumulative performance of firms in the top quartile of cash holdings 
in percent of assets and in the top quartile of leverage, international sample
Third, the role of international trade has received surprisingly little 
attention. In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming), we document that 
US firms with more export or supply chain exposure to China ex-
perienced substantially lower cumulative abnormal returns during 
the Outbreak period, and to a lesser extent in the Incubation period. 
8 Fahlenbrach, Rageth and Stulz (2020) confirm our results for the US sample. Ding 
et al. (2020) report similar results in international data.
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More generally, internationally-oriented companies did poorly over 
these periods. Interestingly, when China seemed to get COVID-19 un-
der control, whereas the situation in Europe and the US worsened, 
the effects reversed. This suggests that a second wave hitting spe-
cific countries might again see a drop in the value of firms relative-
ly more exposed to those particular countries.
Fourth, besides ‘hard’ factors such as the degree of exposure to 
lockdown measures, financial strength, and reliance on internation-
al trade, some ‘softer’ factors may play an important role. For exam-
ple, Albuquerque et al. (2020) and Garel and Petit-Romec (2020) doc-
ument that stocks of firms with high environmental and social (ES) 
ratings fared better during the market turmoil. Li et al. (2020) show 
that stocks of firms with a strong corporate culture did better.
One natural question raised by these results is which investors val-
ued which aspects and why. Our early-stage work in Glossner et al. 
(2020) suggests that institutional investors overall focused on hard 
measures of financial resilience and did not noticeably increase their 
stakes in high-ES firms (suggesting that retail investors may have 
been responsible for the strong performance of these companies).
4 Policy Interventions and Stock Price Reactions
Some interventions, such as lockdowns or stay-at-home orders, were 
directly aimed at containing the spread of the virus. The financial 
market responses to such interventions have been investigated in a 
number of studies. The first-order effect is negative for business ac-
cording to some studies, at least in the short term, though these in-
terventions do reduce infection and death rates (Barrot, Grassi, Sau-
vagnat 2020). However, because stock returns do respond to daily 
unanticipated changes in COVID-19 cases (Alfaro et al. 2020), such 
interventions can also have indirect beneficial effects for businesses 
(Ashraf 2020; Chen et al. 2020). Further research is needed to clari-
fy the conditions under which interventions are (perceived as) harm-
ful or beneficial to the value of firms.
There were important and novel interventions by central banks.9 
For example, on Monday, March 23 the US Federal Reserve Board 
(Fed) announced two new facilities – the “Primary Market Corporate 
Credit Facility” and the “Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facili-
ty” – to support credit to large corporations at least up to the end of 
9 The initial intervention by the US Federal Reserve Board to cut interest rates was 
met with a negative stock market response. Presumably, it was interpreted as a signal 
that the situation was about to get worse.
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Q3 2020.10 On April 9, the Fed expanded those programs.11 Consider-
ing short-term corporate bond reactions, D’Amico, Kurakula and Lee 
et al. (2020), Haddad, Moreira and Muir (2020) and Nozawa and Qiu 
(2020) find evidence in line with the notion that the Fed’s actions en-
hanced overall economic prospects and thus reduced default risk of 
borrowers.12 In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming), we find differen-
tiated effects of the March 23 announcement. Stocks with high lev-
erage and low cash-holdings initially benefited, but after ten days, 
the effect had reversed. Investors’ concerns about corporate leverage 
and liquidity seem to have diminished somewhat after April 9, when 
the Fed announced a significant expansion of its programs. One dif-
ficulty in assessing the impacts of these measures is that there was 
also news about the spread of COVID-19, which would work against 
the potential positive effects of the Fed’s intervention. The future will 
reveal the long-term effects of these interventions.13
There were also fiscal policy interventions. For example, Ashraf 
(2020) finds a neutral effect of income and debt relief support to 
households, whereas K.J. Heyden and T. Heyden (2020) find that the 
announcement of country-specific fiscal policy measures has negative 
effects on stock returns. Future research should investigate under 
which conditions such programs may have positive effects, and how 
different firms were affected by these various types of interventions.14 
Finally, appropriate political communication is likely to have 
played a major role.15 Uncertainty plays a key role in the market 
response (Gormsen, Koijen 2020; Landier, Thesmar 2020). Political 
credibility and clear communication are key to reduce uncertainty 
on both the pandemic and the policy responses, and hence, in turn, 





12 Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy (2020) provide a theoretical analysis.
13 Although large central banks’ interventions in the corporate debt and equity markets 
can certainly help listed corporations accessing external capital, they may also have unin-
tended effects in terms of pricing distortion. See, for instance, Barbon, Gianinazzi 2019.
14 For example, as described in Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2020), various pro-
visions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that had been relevant to stock price responses at 
the implementation of that Act were rolled back or altered by the CARES Act.
15 Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2020) provide survey evidence that household 
beliefs and spending plans do not appear to be affected much by policy responses. Inter-
estingly, Hanspal, Weber and Wohlfart (2020) show that the stock market crash severely 
affected expectations of households, for example, regarding retirement age. Thus, tan-
gible, realised losses do appear to shift household expectations. It will be interesting 
to see whether these expectations reverse as well as the market in the second quarter. 
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5 What is Behind the Exuberant Second Quarter of 2020?
The first quarter of 2020 saw extreme uncertainty and steep stock 
market declines. The real economy entered a state of emergency, un-
employment soared in many countries, corporate earnings proved 
dismal, and double-digit percentage GDP drops never seen before 
occurred. Yet, in the Recovery period the stock market rose virtu-
ally everywhere.
Large stock price reversals were common across firms, as figure 4 
illustrates. This figure is a binned scatter plot. We sort all 29,465 in-
ternational firms for which data is available into 100 equal-sized bins 
of cumulative returns in the Fever period. The vertical axis plots the 
average cumulative returns in the Recovery period within each bin. 
The stock returns in the Recovery period strongly negatively corre-
late to those in the Fever period. Interestingly, companies that had 
small negative or even positive returns did not on average experi-
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Figure 4 Returns in Fever and the Recovery Periods
How should one interpret the extraordinary market performance in 
the second quarter and the pattern in figure 4? This question will 
surely spur substantial future research. In the following, we suggest 
a few possible explanations which might be worth further investigat-
ing (and which may not be mutually exclusive).
First, suppose that investors genuinely expected the worst to be 
over, and hence inferred that valuations at the end of the second 
quarter should be back to their pre-crisis levels (or slightly higher, 
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as investors also need to earn their cost of capital). Simple arithme-
tic then yields a shape consistent with the one plotted in figure 4.16 
Intuitively, a stock that falls by 50% has to rise by 100% to get back 
to the initial level, whereas a stock that falls by 10% only has to rise 
by 11.1%. Notice that for this Recovery Arithmetic to be a candidate 
explanation, investors would need to see both expected future cash 
flows and uncertainty at similar levels as in the pre-crisis period. 
While it is plausible that discount factors substantially declined dur-
ing the second quarter, general macroeconomic forecasts remain dis-
mal in many countries.
Second, figure 4 shows that the few firms that had been winners 
in the Fever period and had exhibited positive returns do not, in fact, 
on average show negative returns in the Recovery period (as they 
would under the Recovery Arithmetic). This finding may reflect sus-
tained and structural changes in the economy and in how we live 
and work, which give especially certain technology companies enor-
mous advantages.
Third, the medium-term stock price reaction to the Fed’s inter-
vention announcements may drive the returns. In other words, the 
Fed is providing enormous liquidity and is indirectly supporting also 
firms that did not suffer that much in the Fever period. (There is no 
official distinction by industry in the Fed’s bond purchase programs, 
for example.) This would also imply that there is distortion in market 
prices away from fundamentals.
Fourth, the Recovery returns may be driven by individual inves-
tors, who may have ‘bought the dip’ gambling on the rebound of stock 
prices perhaps amplified by a prolonged intervention of the Fed in-
to capital markets.17
In work in progress, we are seeking to distinguish these explana-
tions, in particular with the goal of determining the relative impor-
tance of fundamentals versus liquidity provided by central banks in 
driving assets prices.
16 Consider a stock with an annual cost of equity of k%. Suppose for simplicity that 
the stock pays no dividend. Roughly, we would expect a price appreciation for that stock 
for the first two quarters of 0.5*k%. Suppose the stock price change in the first quar-
ter (or in the Fever period, assuming things were flat before) was f% (where for most 
stocks, f<0). Then, to get to the expected price target by the end of Q2, the stock price 
change in the Recovery period would need to be r = (1+0.5*k)/(1+f). Plotting this rela-
tionship with r on the vertical axis and f on the horizontal axis yields a non-linear re-
lationship such as figure 4.
17 In Glossner et al. (2020) we find that investors on “Robinhood” (a low-cost platform 
increasingly popular among retail investors) tended to increase holdings in high-lever-
age and low-cash holdings during the first quarter of 2020. Thus, these investors tar-
geted companies that suffered heavily in the Fever period; conversely, they may, there-
fore, have done very well in the Recovery period.
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6 Implications for Business and Public Policy 
It is far too early to declare that an end is in sight for the COVID-19 
pandemic. While the stock market, as a forward-looking device, has 
been sending positive signals through the steep rise in the second 
quarter of 2020, valuations remain tenuous. A resurgence of uncer-
tainty may lead to another round of sharp drops in equity markets. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the second quarter was indeed a sus-
tainable recovery, or just a temporary phase before a heavy relapse 
or perhaps even a devastating collapse.
Regardless, for corporate decision-makers and policy-makers, 
some lessons of the first quarter 2020 are already clear. A powerful 
driver of corporate resilience – which, in turn, helps also to secure 
jobs and sustain the broader economy – has been a sufficiently strong 
financial position before the pandemic hit. Worryingly, the COVID-19 
crisis is leading to a substantial increase in both corporate and pub-
lic debt, which will potentially exacerbate the existing fragilities of 
the financial markets. A critical policy objective will be to find new 
ways to reduce these fragilities.
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